And Russia, from the same thread:
To:FaultLine who wrote (112)
From: Condor Sunday, Sep 16, 2001 8:23 PM
Respond to of 148
Other sources of info. and commentary:
worldtribune.com
Within the body of the following item is a very troubling Russian observation.
worldtribune.com
stratfor.com
Russia's View, Russia's Options
2130 GMT, 010915
stratfor.com
The Kremlin -- a crucial potential ally in the United States newly declared war on
terrorism -- is debating the proper course to take. Siding with Washington could mean a
golden opportunity to have the United States acknowledge Russia's geopolitical
interests in the former Soviet Union, but it also presents dangerous potential for future
domestic troubles. For President Vladimir Putin, the short-term benefits of supporting a
U.S. campaign in Afghanistan are likely to win over the very real and reasonable
long-term strategic fears.
Analysis
One of the elements of U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism will be a sustained
campaign to break Afghanistan's Taliban regime. This has both operational and
symbolic value: It denies sanctuary to those suspected of organizing the Sept. 11
attacks in the United States while serving as a deterrent to other regimes that might
provide -- or consider providing -- sanctuary. Thus, whatever else the United States
does, Afghanistan is going to be hit, and hard. There will be two targets: Osama bin
Laden himself and as important, the Taliban government.
Carrying out a sustained mission, however, will be extremely difficult for the United
States. The United States could strike at Afghanistan from the air using ship-launched
cruise missiles and long-range aircraft -- such as B-52s flying out of the United States
or Diego Garcia -- but that does not constitute the foundation for a sustained attack. For
that, tactical aircraft in large numbers must be based around Afghanistan. In addition,
special operations forces must be available on the ground to carry out missions that
cannot be conducted from the air.
Russia could provide the answers for Washington's toughest logistical problems.
The United States has two problems. First, it does not have tactical airbases in place
for a sustained air attack on Afghanistan. The United States has no aircraft in the region
of Afghanistan, and bases in Turkey and Saudi Arabia are too far away. Sorties would
be cut dramatically, even if the problem of mid-air refueling over Iran were solved. The
same problem applies to special operations troops.
Second, even if any nearby states permit the United States to base fighter aircraft in
country, building up enough forces and -- most important -- the logistical infrastructure
needed would take months. Until then, only small-scale operations are possible.
Russia, however, is in a position to begin a sustained air offensive very quickly. Its
special operations forces have substantial experience -- albeit not particularly happy
experience -- in Afghanistan. The Russians could use still-operational bases in
Tajikistan to launch air strikes. Indeed, the Russians still have an airbase in northern
Afghanistan -- Bagram, in the area controlled by the Northern Alliance, where Russian
transports still fly regular support missions. The Northern Alliance remains effective even
though its leader has been killed by Taliban agents.
Russian participation would allow the United States to strike at the Taliban much more
quickly than it otherwise could. Russia could also provide Washington with bases for
American aircraft and special forces down the road.
Russia's defense minister has publicly stated that the country is not prepared to
participate in this war. Sources close to Russian intelligence, however, tell STRATFOR
that the debate on Russia's course is intense, and that President Vladimir Putin in
particular is intrigued by the possibilities of cooperating with the United States. These
reports make a lot of sense.
Russia's concern has long been that it lost all leverage with the United States after the
Cold War. Its financial and geopolitical needs could not be satisfied without American
cooperation, but the Americans, having little need of the Russians, were not
cooperating. On one level, the new war provides Russia with a golden opportunity.
Moscow has at least three compelling reasons to participate in Washington's war on
terrorism.
First, there is no question that if Russia in essence rented out its air force for an Afghan
campaign, Moscow could ask for massive financial concessions from the United States
and the West -- and would probably get them in the form of underwriting the operation.
Thus, several financing streams would open to the Russians: The multilateral spigot of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund would undoubtedly be turned on, as
would informal pressure for Western banks to support Russia's infrastructure. Direct
payments to support Russian military operations would also help revive the capabilities
of the armed forces.
Second, and as important, Putin could easily link the air campaign with Russia's
geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Russians have worked
very hard to link the events of Sept. 11 with Chechnya. They have argued that the same
people are behind both conflicts, and that a successful counter-attack will require a
solution to their Chechen problem. Since the Chechen issue is closely linked to the
status of the entire Caucasus region, an American concession on this point would
inevitably lead to the imposition of a Russian sphere of influence there, to say the least.
Moreover, a sustained Afghan war would have to emanate from Central Asia. The
security of Russian forces there would require the United States to accept the
imposition of Russian security measures in a region where U.S. oil companies have
close working relations with local governments not particularly eager to fall under
Russian sway. Nevertheless, the United States could not simultaneously ask for
Russian participation and deny the Russians the right to act with politico-military
prudence.
Third, Russia would clearly position itself as an integral part of the Western alliance
system -- a political windfall for Putin. Russian liberals, who could normally be expected
to oppose any revival of Russian involvement in Afghanistan, would see this particular
case as an opportunity for linkage with the West and hence, for increased liberalization.
Russian conservatives, who would normally be appalled at working for the United
States, would see this not only as an opportunity to move toward the reestablishment of
the geographical framework of the Soviet Union, but would undoubtedly receive a pledge
to bar further NATO expansion in return for Russian participation.
But the Kremlin also has longterm reasons to balk at participation in the war on
terrorism.
Russians are extremely wary of the new Powell doctrine, which has stated that the
future litmus test for U.S. relations with any other country will be their behavior toward
the United States in this war. They see it as the United States using the war to reshape
the international system to its benefit. In recent months, the world had shifted from a
unipolar model to something much more multipolar, with China and Russia both
resisting American authority. The current crisis, paradoxically, increases the American
capacity for imposing its order on the world.
Moreover, Russia is already a major target for radical Islamic terrorists, and could
become the main one. If Moscow actively supports Washington in the upcoming
campaign, its geographic proximity to hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism, its relative
political weakness and even its demographics create the potential for longterm threats.
Murat Murtazin, rector of Moscow's Islamic College, estimates that 20 million of
Russia's 145 million people are Muslim. Birth rates for Muslims exceed those of ethnic
Russians and other segments, according to the Environmental and Health Atlas of
Russia. The growing Muslim population would make waging war on Islamists -- even of
the terrorist ilk -- dicey.
Last but not least, Russian strategists fear America will get what it wants in the region
at the expense of thousands of Russian soldiers' lives. Afghans are extremely tough
fighters who have already beaten off British and Soviet invasions.
The Russians are therefore struggling with two imperatives. On one hand, they do not
want a world dominated by American power. On the other hand, if the world is to be
dominated by American power, they certainly want a front-row seat. Some in Russia
argue that this is a grand opportunity to secure that seat. Others say that sowing the
short-term wind will reap a long-term whirlwind. If the United States wins this war, its
gratitude will be short-lived, and its interests will not be Russia's.
We think a debate is raging inside the Kremlin on the proper course. We also suspect
that the short-term benefits of supporting a U.S. campaign in Afghanistan will ultimately
win out over the very real and reasonable long-term strategic fears. Therefore, as the
United States moves toward a war with Afghanistan, the world may well see rare joint
U.S.-Russian military operations. There is a convergence of interest here worth
observing. |
