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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (64480)1/5/2003 5:31:01 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
A Lesson In U.S. Propaganda

By Mark Crispin Miller
AlterNet
January 3, 2003

alternet.org

Last week, a once-notorious Iraqi site made news again. Seeking evidence of biological weapons production, United Nations arms inspectors swooped into the closed industrial facility at Abu Ghreib, outside Baghdad – the same plant that U.S. forces bombed on Jan. 23, 1991.

The Iraqis claimed in '91 that the site was a baby milk factory and nothing more, a charge reported by Peter Arnett on CNN and then denied by the U.S. government. "Numerous sources have indicated that [the factory] is associated with biological warfare production," an Air Force spokesman said at the time, a few hours after the bombing. "It was a biological weapons facility, of that we are sure," repeated Colin Powell later that same day.

"That factory is, in fact, a production facility for biological weapons," repeated White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. "The Iraqis have hidden this facility behind a façade of baby-milk production as a form of disinformation."

Baby Milk or Lethal Virus?

The U.S. claim seemed credible, especially because of the crude way in which Iraq had made its case. Arnett's report included shots of a tall red-lettered sign, "Baby Milk Plant," in Arabic and English, posted at the ruined factory's entrance. That makeshift piece of work was not convincing. CNN's coverage also included shots of an Iraqi technician in the factory, dressed in a lab coat with the legend, "BABY MILK PLANT IRAQ," stitched in English on the back.

Despite such comic hints of fraudulence and denials issued by Washington, Arnett stood firm. He had toured the factory in August (for a story on Iraq's response to the international sanctions), and again just after it was bombed. "Whatever else it did, it did produce infant formula," Arnett said at the time. Although the Pentagon had cast the factory as a veritable fortress, with "military guards around it, [a] barbed wire fence, a military garrison outside," Arnett saw only one guard at the gate and a lot of powdered baby milk. "That's as much as I could tell you about it," he added carefully. "It looked innocent enough from what we could see."

For his account, the journalist was accused of treason by the White House.

"Everything that Peter Arnett reports is approved by, censored by and reviewed – on the spot – by the Iraqi government," Fitzwater exploded the next day. "This is not a case of taking on the media. It's a case of correcting a public disclosure that is erroneous, that is false, that hurts our government, and that plays into the hands of Saddam Hussein."

Such repudiation from on high – and those shots of the suspicious sign and lab coat – appeared to settle the matter. The major media outlets unanimously jeered what Newsweek called Iraq's "ham-handed attempt to depict a bombed-out biological-weapons plant near Baghdad as a baby-formula factory." So pervasive was the merriment at the Iraqis' "little sham of baby milk" (as Time put it) that the phrase "baby milk factory" at once became expressive of the enemy's complete dishonesty.

The theme of Iraqi falseness quickly reemerged after the U.N. team revisited the site last week. "They are engaging in disinformation, propaganda," said one commentator on the Fox News Channel. "If you remember during the Gulf War, the Iraqis put out the sign that said 'Baby Milk Factory,' when we – the United States, the Pentagon – said, 'No, it was a military installation.'"

Disinformation Trumps Facts

Although it sounded credible enough in 1991, the U.S. claim was weak – although you wouldn't know it from the TV coverage. After the bombing, Michel Wery, the plant's contractor, told the French daily Liberation that the factory was making baby milk when it first started up in 1979, and that its equipment was not built to breed or package viruses. In early February, he reconfirmed his story for the Washington Post, which also quoted two dairy technicians from New Zealand, Malcolm Seamark and Kevin Lowe, who had been inside the plant at least four times, to help another French crew make repairs. Both men corroborated Arnett's story.

"It was all typical dairy plant equipment," Seamark noted, and the two confirmed that the plant was "actually canning milk powder" during their last visit in May of 1990.

In response, three unnamed US government sources reconfirmed the

U.S. line – albeit incoherently, as their stories disagreed. A White House official claimed that the plant had been converted in the fall of 1990. A second source held that the site was built for bio-weapons from the start – but only as a "back-up" facility, which was inoperative when it was bombed. The third source said that it was not a bio-weapons factory per se, but made items crucial to such work.

But even as they contradicted one another, all three claimed the benefit of inside information. "There is no question in our mind that we were going after a military target," said one. "I can't say why. We have a lot of intelligence. We had people [in Baghdad] until January of 1991."

Whatever those officials knew, the fact is that the US also had "people in Baghdad" after that January – and one of them, months later, provided information that corroborated the accounts of Arnett, Wery, Lowe and Seamark.

In a confidential memo drafted in December 1992 (and released later under the Freedom of Information Act), a State Department employee in Amman reported the debriefing of an Arab businessman, who had much to say about Iraq's food imports and currency supply. He also offered testimony on the subject of the factory, which he knew inside out. "Though showing no sympathy for the Baghdad regime, he confirmed that the Abu Ghreib 'baby milk factory' bombed by the Allies during Desert Storm had been a genuine factory for producing powdered milk, and not a military plant." He had found no hidden chambers there, no inappropriate machinery.

So, was Iraq "engaging in disinformation, propaganda," when it accused the U.S. of bombing a baby milk factory? What about the sign and lab coat? According to the two New Zealanders, those embroidered coats had been provided by the French concern that built the factory. Moreover, the footage showing the uniforms had actually been shot by Arnett's crew when they visited the site in August 1990, five months before the war.

On the other hand, that sudden large sign was certainly a piece of propaganda. But the purpose of such stagecraft was to advertise the fact of baby-milk production, not feign it.

Iraq, in trying to publicize the targeting of its civilian infrastructure, had engaged in clumsy propaganda (which backfired in the West), while the US counter-propaganda was apparently disinformation (which succeeded).

Propaganda War Part II

As we sit and wait for another war against Iraq, we should remember this triumphant bit of spin – and all the other winning lies of Operation Desert Storm. The Gulf War was itself a propaganda masterpiece, which wowed the TV audience far more than it threatened the grotesque regime in Baghdad. And because the propaganda always blocked our view of things, it left us with important questions that remain unanswered to this day:

How exactly – and for how long – did the Reagan and the Bush administrations fund and arm Saddam? (The president obscures that cozy prior relationship, by harping on Hussein's "unrelenting hostility to the United States.")

Why did April Glaspie, our ambassador in Baghdad, tell Hussein, one week before he grabbed Kuwait, that the U.S. had "no opinion" on "your border disagreement"? (Bush II obscures the episode by charging, often, that Hussein has "struck other nations without warning.")

Where is the evidence that Iraq threatened Saudi Arabia? In the summer of 1990, that claim was crucial to the drive for war. We heard that some 200,000 Ba'athist troops were massed along the southern border of Kuwait, prepared to snatch the Saudi oil fields. To get the Saudis on our side, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney flew to Riyadh with a sheaf of satellite photos that allegedly exposed the danger. Just then a Russian firm released another set of photos showing no troops on the border. The US photos are still classified. Why?

Why, since Desert Storm, have more than 160,000 of its US veterans been provided medical or disability benefits – over twice the rate of other wars? What were they exposed to on the battlefield?

And how many Iraqi soldiers and civilians died? (Like the Pentagon, Saddam Hussein prefers to keep the matter closed.) Was the bombing of civilian infrastructure a deliberate strategy to foment revolution? If so, it was a violation of the Geneva Conventions. Were outright war crimes committed by our side, as journalist Seymour Hersh reported in April 2000?

As with the purpose of the factory at Abu Ghreib, such questions do have answers, and those answers might be found – and our democracy would be the stronger for it. Far from coming up with any truths, however, President Bush, in his campaign to re-invade, has only offered us new fabrications. There is no evidence that Saddam Hussein works with al Qaeda, or that his weapons are – like North Korea's – a clear and present danger, or that the president himself does not plan to attack in any case.

As we approach the anniversary of the start of Desert Storm, we should be ready for another war, and less inclined than ever to believe in it.

____________________________________________________
Mark Crispin Miller is a professor of media studies at New York University and the author of "The Bush Dyslexicon: Observations on a National Disorder" (Norton).



To: tekboy who wrote (64480)1/5/2003 5:38:14 PM
From: carranza2  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Wohlforth & Brooks

Now, that was good. We discussed it here to some extent.

Doran's article was pretty good.

Ajami's article was pretty good.

I haven't read anything worth a damn yet that discusses what our mid to long term policy with respect to Egypt should be. A real hot spot in about 2-3 years, mark my words. Any suggestions?

2@comboofIhateUSIslamistseverywherenoresourceslots ofpeopleapovertyandrepressionusuallygoesBOOOM!.com



To: tekboy who wrote (64480)1/5/2003 5:56:51 PM
From: paul_philp  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 

I thought much of what he said struck me as pretty commonplace by now


Tekboy,

I think it is quite rare to find a big piece in the popular media that addresses the broad problems inherent in the idea of American Imperialism and the broad messiness of the world situation. I think that the public debate about the American foreign policy and world situation has been lacking thoughtful critique and dissent. There are many single factor critics but few who take into account the many ambigous and contradictory factors shaping the world now. In the end, Ignatieff never resolved his ambivalence but he does cover a lot of ground that I do not see covered in the popular media often.


Also, I think that the bulk of current American foreign policy activism is quite predictable if one takes three things into account--the rise in relative power that has occurred over the last decade, the basic nature of American political ideals, and the catalyzing impact of 9/11. So I personally think that the supposed novelty or importance of the discussion or thought or what have you that has taken place over the last year and change--including the much ballyhooed National Security Strategy--is vastly overplayed. IMHO, that is, it's all been superstructural hot air, driven primarily by changes in the material base and the triggering effects of contingent historical events.


All due respect tekboy but isn't his paragraph self-contradictory? If one takes into account what is new and unique about the situation, then it is predictable and overplayed? Is it possible that you have become climatized to the new situation?


the rise in relative power that has occurred over the last decade, the basic nature of American political ideals, and the catalyzing impact of 9/11


As I have said before, "Other than that Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?".


PS anybody really interested in following what the big-league debate over American grand strategy in the post-Cold-War era has been should check out this collection, which contains many of the "greatest hits" of that discussion:


Wow, I was bemoaning the lack of just such a book over the holidays. Post-Cold War for Dummies. Just what I need and I look forward to reading it. Thanks.

Paul



To: tekboy who wrote (64480)1/5/2003 6:05:31 PM
From: greenspirit  Respond to of 281500
 
Speaking of Kagan, I enjoyed this piece...

War And the Fickle Left

By Robert Kagan
Tuesday, December 24, 2002; Page A15
washingtonpost.com

"Must the decision to use force always be made multilaterally?" Michael Walzer -- the renowned liberal philosopher, ethicist and just-war theorist -- posed this question not so long ago in an article in the New Republic. And his answer was, unequivocally, no. Noting that "the argument against unilateralism" was the "favorite argument of Americans who opposed an attack on Iraq," Walzer argued that the opponents were wrong. "Some unilateral uses of force can be justified," he insisted. "Some might even be morally necessary."

Iraq was such a case. "When a state like Iraq is known to possess weapons of mass destruction, and is known to have used them in the past, the refusal of a U.N. majority to act forcefully isn't a good reason for ruling out the use of force by any member state that can use it effectively." In fact, Walzer concluded, "if we are not ready, sometimes, to act unilaterally, we are not ready for real life in international society."

Walzer's short essay was full of wisdom and clear thinking, but before I go any further, I need to reveal two facts: First, Walzer's article was published in April 1998, a couple of months after the Clinton administration nearly went to war over Saddam Hussein's refusal to allow U.N. weapons inspectors access to certain suspicious sites; and second, Walzer apparently no longer holds this view. But more on that in a moment. Let's get back to wisdom and clarity.

Walzer's simple but profound point in 1998 was that the anarchic nature of the international system makes some unilateral action unavoidable. He attacked the Wilsonian fallacy that international society operates according to the same principles as domestic society. In domestic society, "the democratic state possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and a near-monopoly on the actual use of force." Individuals have no need to act unilaterally to defend themselves because the state defends them. Therefore, they have no justification for acting unilaterally. They can submit to the democratic process and the rule of law without fear that something "absolutely awful" will happen to them.

But the international system is different. Because no international authority holds a monopoly of power, Walzer argued, nations cannot entrust their fate to international institutions or to international law. No nation can allow questions affecting its vital interests to be decided by a majority vote in the U.N. Security Council, because the U.N. Security Council cannot protect that nation in the event the majority makes a mistake and something "absolutely awful" happens. According to Walzer, American unilateral action was justified in some cases because "absolutely awful things happen all the time in international society, and anyone who can stop them or prevent them surely has a right, perhaps a duty, to do so."

Walzer had disdain for those who denied this "obvious" argument. Their denial stemmed "in part from a wish that international society be more like domestic society, and then from the wishful belief that it is actually becoming more like domestic society -- and won't unilateral action interfere with this happy process?" Nor did Walzer believe the United States could rely on arms control regimes. "One might well hope for an international regime banning or regulating" weapons of mass destruction, he argued. And it made sense to work for one. But until such efforts produced "a reliable result," which manifestly they had not, then "unilateral action" was still "a legitimate recourse."

Walzer thus made the case for "preventive" war in certain situations -- situations such as Iraq. True, preventive wars had "generally been ruled out" under international law. Before the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nations had other ways to meet evolving threats short of preventive war. But "the argument looks different" in an era of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, "which are developed in secret, and which might be used suddenly, without warning, with catastrophic results." In such a world a nation such as the United States could act preventively and unilaterally to stop such weapons from being used or even developed, and be morally justified in doing so. This was an unpleasant prospect, perhaps, but as Walzer put it, such is "real life in international society."

Anyway, that's what Walzer thought in 1998. Today Walzer opposes war against Iraq as "neither just nor necessary." He argues (again in the New Republic) that the United States has no compelling case either for unilateral action or for preventive war. The United States does not face a "real threat" from Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. Israel and Iraq's other neighbors do, but they "have not authorized" the United States to defend them. So the once "obvious" arguments for action seem to have melted away. Today Walzer still insists that "there was a just and necessary war waiting to be fought back in the 1990s when Saddam was playing hide-and-seek with the inspectors." But no longer.

What changed? Certainly not "real life in international society." Certainly not the nature of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein has never stopped playing hide-and-seek with the inspectors. Iraq's neighbors hadn't "authorized" the United States to defend them in 1998 any more than they have now. And to suggest that the American case for preventive war is weaker today, after Sept. 11, 2001, than it was four years ago is manifestly absurd.

Walzer's illogical about-face is embarrassing but, sadly, not unique. Yesterday's liberal interventionists, in Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti, are today's liberal abstentionists. What changed? Just the man in the White House. Intellectual consistency, even for great thinkers, is no match for partisan passions.



To: tekboy who wrote (64480)1/5/2003 9:12:17 PM
From: JohnM  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Interesting comments, tek. I thought my comparison of Ajami and Ignatieff would get the most reaction since several here were taken with the Ajami piece and I was not. But I think both wish to think large, drop insights, and write well but not clearly. And neither summons evidence for arguments cleanly and clearly made. Plusses and minuses.

I like the comparison you offer between the Kagan piece and the Wohlforth & Brooks piece. My own version of that is the Kagan piece and the co-authored piece Ken Pollack did which also appeared in Policy Review. But I think the terms of the discussions, whichever was paired with Kagan, would be roughly the same. It's not whether there is an American empire but the terms of its management. A very large topic.

IMHO, that is, it's all been superstructural hot air, driven primarily by changes in the material base and the triggering effects of contingent historical events

Interesting conceptual framework at work there. But, to stick with that, many folk who work within that framework note that the superstructure not only can act "relatively autonomously" to base but those actions can, in turn, alter the base. In short, the hot air of preemptive invasion can alter the actual strength of the US because it erodes the soft power. To stay within the language of your field.



To: tekboy who wrote (64480)1/6/2003 2:01:31 AM
From: KLP  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
tek...the link you posted is unavailable...it it correct, or maybe it will work tomorrow....