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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Maurice Winn who wrote (159283)	2/27/2006 2:49:00 PM
From: michael97123	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 794009

I was talking strictly about the people. Both nations have been hardened by being out there as the only folks participating in their self defense. For the US self defense involves protecting allies who dont always seem to appreciate us at all. So america becomes more militaristic because the others quit protecting themselves. I kind of resent that. I would rather be the one drinking wine and pontificating on evil france as the worlds policeman.

To: Maurice Winn who wrote (159283)	2/27/2006 3:30:26 PM
From: kech	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 794009

The WMDs claim was always a joke - hunting for BigFoot amused me [last seen running over the horizon into Syria, or maybe hiding underground] Any reading of Duelfer report indicates that even if WMD's went running over the horizon into Syria, the strategic intent Saddam's regime was to keep all capabilities intact while lobbying to drop the sanctions. He would then be free to reconstitute very quickly. This is the primary claim of the Duelfer report. So to you this means the WMD claim was always a joke? Key Findings Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted. * Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic policy. * Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring. * The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. * By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. * Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary. * Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire. * The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them. Note on Methodological Approach cia.gov

To: Maurice Winn who wrote (159283)	2/27/2006 4:20:22 PM
From: kech	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 794009

NZ and others were happy to help in Afghanistan and did so and largely achieved the goal [though Osama escaped due to bad management]. No free ride there. I had not known that New Zealand contributed 50 SAS soldiers and a C-130 to the fight in Afghanistan. They are listed way below France in contribution though (just above Romania) and since I distinctly recall France announcing their entry into the War in December long after the war was essentially over I am curious to know more about the timing of the New Zealand entry? Was it really in time to do anything? In any case, the symbolic gesture is helpful even if late in the game. Perhaps it was offered earlier but the US hadn't found a way to use them until later? I am pretty sure though that France did not offer earlier. absoluteastronomy.com