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Politics : I Will Continue to Continue, to Pretend.... -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	6/30/2005 7:04:15 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Rolling Rockefeller The vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee once saw "a substantial connection between Saddam and al Qaeda." Not any more. by Stephen F. Hayes The Weekly Standard 06/30/2005 12:00:00 AM FEW PEOPLE have been more critical of the Iraq war than Senator Jay Rockefeller, a Democrat from West Virginia. He has over the past two years repeatedly accused the Bush administration of deliberately deceiving the American public to take the nation to war. It's hard to imagine a more serious charge. And Rockefeller makes it perhaps more credibly than most Iraq War critics--as the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. It's no surprise then that reporters sought out Rockefeller for his reaction to George W. Bush's address to the nation Tuesday night. The junior senator from West Virginia minced no words. Iraq, he said: "had nothing to do with Osama bin Laden, it had nothing to do with al-Qaida, it had nothing to do with September 11, which he managed to mention three or four times and infer three or four more times." This, Rockefeller seems to find outrageous. "It's sort of amazing that a president could stand up before hundreds of millions of Americans and say that and come back to 9/11--somehow figuring that it clicks a button, that everybody grows more patriotic and more patient. Well, maybe that's good p.r. work, which it isn't, but it's not the way that a commander in chief executes a war. And that's his responsibility in this case." It is an attack on President Bush that echoes those we've heard from Democrats--both those on the fringe left and those at the top of the party--for the past 27 months. And it is nonsense. This is what Jay Rockefeller said on the floor of the U.S. Senate on October 10, 2002. His speech announced his support for the resolution authorizing the Iraq war. As the attacks of September 11 demonstrated, the immense destructiveness of modern technology means we can no longer afford to wait around for a smoking gun. September 11 demonstrated that the fact that an attack on our homeland has not yet occurred cannot give us any false sense of security that one will not occur in the future. We no longer have that luxury. September 11 changed America. It made us realize we must deal differently with the very real threat of terrorism, whether it comes from shadowy groups operating in the mountains of Afghanistan or in 70 other countries around the world, including our own. There has been some debate over how "imminent" a threat Iraq poses. I do believe that Iraq poses an imminent threat, but I also believe that after September 11, that question is increasingly outdated. By my count, that's four references to September 11 in just three paragraphs, as rendered by Rockefeller's own Senate website. And there, in the final paragraph of that passage, Rockefeller says something the Bush administration managed to avoid saying: that Iraq posed an imminent threat. It's worth noting, further, that the resolution that Rockefeller supported made specific mention of al Qaeda's presence in Iraq: "Members of al Qaeda, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks that occurred on September 11, are known to be in Iraq." What of Rockefeller's comments yesterday that Iraq had nothing to do with al Qaeda? Rockefeller didn't mention Osama bin Laden's global terror network in his floor speech that day. Here's what he did say: "Saddam's government has contact with many international terrorist organizations that likely have cells here in the United States." "He could make those weapons [WMD] available to many terrorist groups which have contact with his government, and those groups could bring those weapons into the U.S. and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly." He added: Some argue it would be totally irrational for Saddam Hussein to initiate an attack against the mainland United States, and they believe he would not do it. But if Saddam thought he could attack America through terrorist proxies and cover the trail back to Baghdad, he might not think it so irrational. If he thought, as he got older and looked around an impoverished and isolated Iraq, that his principal legacy to the Arab world would be a brutal attack on the United States, he might not think it so irrational. And if he thought the U.S. would be too paralyzed with fear to respond, he might not think it so irrational. I called Rockefeller's office Wednesday in an attempt to learn the names of the "many terrorist groups" whose contacts with the former Iraqi regime helped create an "imminent threat." And which of those "international terrorist organizations likely have cells here in the United States" that threaten us here at home. Wendy Morigi, Rockefeller's communications director, returned the call. "He was talking about the Palestinian groups that had established relationships with Saddam," she said. "Abu Nidal was living in Baghdad before the war." Maybe. But one week before his floor speech, Rockefeller gave an interview to the Charleston Gazette. The senator hypothesized about Saddam "getting older" and using not Palestinian groups but al Qaeda to do his dirty work. Rockefeller told the paper. "If you go pre-emptive, do you cause Hussein to strike where he might not have? He is not a martyr, not a Wahabbi, not a Muslim radical. He does not seek martyrdom. But he is getting older," "Maybe he is seeking a legacy by attacking Israel or using al-Qaeda cells around the world." I asked Morigi if Senator Rockefeller believed before the war that Iraq had a relationship with al Qaeda. "No." Odd then that Senator Rockefeller would have spoken of a "substantial connection between Saddam and al Qaeda" just one month before the Iraq War began. In some interviews Rockefeller did say that he hadn't seen evidence of close ties between Iraq and al Qaeda. But asked about an Iraq-al Qaeda relationship by CNN's Wolf Blitzer on February 5, 2003, Rockefeller agreed with Republican Senator Pat Roberts that Abu Musab al Zarqawi's presence in Iraq before the war and his links to a poison camp in northern Iraq were troubling. Rockefeller continued: "The fact that Zarqawi certainly is related to the death of the U.S. aid officer and that he is very close to bin Laden puts at rest, in fairly dramatic terms, that there is at least a substantial connection between Saddam and al Qaeda." Is this really the same person who now says Iraq "had nothing to do with al Qaeda" and who finds it somehow improper to mention the Iraq war and 9/11 in the same speech? Since Rockefeller's recent critique deals specifically with Iraq and terrorism, I will resist the temptation to dwell here on other aspects of Rockefeller's 2002 speech. It's worth noting, however, that the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee told his colleagues that "there is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years." And: "Saddam's existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose a very real threat to America, now." And: "We cannot know for certain that Saddam will use the weapons of mass destruction he currently possesses, or that he will use them against us. But we do know Saddam has the capability." Unmistakable evidence. Existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities. We do know Saddam has the capability. Remember these things the next time you hear Rockefeller and his colleagues accuse the Bush Administration of exaggerating or fabricating the threat from Iraq. Rockefeller ended his 2002 floor speech with yet another direct reference to September 11--his fifth. "September 11 has forever changed the world. We may not like it, but that is the world in which we live. When there is a grave threat to Americans' lives, we have a responsibility to take action to prevent it." Good point. Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard. He is author of The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein has Endangered America, published by Harper Collins weeklystandard.com

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	6/30/2005 7:24:58 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Body of Evidence A CNN anchor gets Iraq and al Qaeda wrong. But will the network issue a correction? by Stephen F. Hayes The Weekly Standard 06/30/2005 "THERE IS NO EVIDENCE that Saddam Hussein was connected in any way to al Qaeda." So declared CNN Anchor Carol Costello in an interview yesterday with Representative Robin Hayes (no relation) from North Carolina. Hayes politely challenged her claim. "Ma'am, I'm sorry, but you're mistaken. There's evidence everywhere. We get access to it. Unfortunately, others don't." CNN played the exchange throughout the day. At one point, anchor Daryn Kagan even seemed to correct Rep. Hayes after replaying the clip. "And according to the record, the 9/11 Commission in its final report found no connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein." The CNN claims are wrong. Not a matter of nuance. Not a matter of interpretation. Just plain incorrect. They are so mistaken, in fact, that viewers should demand an on-air correction. But such claims are, sadly, representative of the broad media misunderstanding of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. Richard Cohen, columnist for the Washington Post, regularly chides the Bush administration for presenting what he calls fabricated or "fictive" links between Iraq and al Qaeda. The editor of the Los Angeles Times scolded the Bush administration for perpetuating the "myth" of such links. "Sixty Minutes" anchor Lesley Stahl put it bluntly: "There was no connection." Conveniently, such analyses ignore statements like this one from Thomas Kean, chairman of the 9/11 Commission. "There was no question in our minds that there was a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda." Hard to believe reporters just missed it--he made the comments at the press conference held to release the commission's final report. And that report detailed several "friendly contacts" between Iraq and al Qaeda, and concluded only that there was no proof of Iraqi involvement in al Qaeda terrorist attacks against American interests. Details, details. There have been several recent developments. One month ago, Jordan's King Abdullah explained to the Arabic-language newspaper al Hayat that his government had tried before the Iraq war to extradite Abu Musab al Zarqawi from Iraq. "We had information that he entered Iraq from a neighboring country, where he lived and what he was doing. We informed the Iraqi authorities about all this detailed information we had, but they didn't respond." He added: "Since Zarqawi entered Iraq before the fall of the former regime we have been trying to have him deported back to Jordan for trial, but our efforts were in vain." One week later, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi told the same newspaper that the new Iraqi government is in possession of documents showing that Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's top deputy, and Zarqawi both entered Iraq in September 1999. (If the documents are authentic, they suggest that Zarqawi may have plotted the Jordanian Millennium attacks from Iraq.) Beyond what people are saying about the Iraq-al Qaeda connection, there is this evidence. In 1992 the Iraqi Intelligence services compiled a list of its assets. On page 14 of the document, marked "Top Secret" and dated March 28, 1992, is the name of Osama bin Laden, who is reported to have a "good relationship" with the Iraqi intelligence section in Syria. The Defense Intelligence Agency has possession of the document and has assessed that it is accurate. In 1993, Saddam Hussein and bin Laden reached an "understanding" that Islamic radicals would refrain from attacking the Iraqi regime in exchange for unspecified assistance, including weapons development. This understanding, which was included in the Clinton administration's indictment of bin Laden in the spring of 1998, has been corroborated by numerous Iraqis and al Qaeda terrorists now in U.S. custody. In 1994, Faruq Hijazi, then deputy director of Iraqi Intelligence, met face-to-face with bin Laden. Bin Laden requested anti-ship limpet mines and training camps in Iraq. Hijazi has detailed the meeting in a custodial interview with U.S. interrogators. In 1995, according to internal Iraqi intelligence documents first reported by the New York Times on June 25, 2004, a "former director of operations for Iraqi Intelligence Directorate 4 met with Mr. bin Laden on Feb. 19." When bin Laden left Sudan in 1996, the document states, Iraqi intelligence sough "other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of his current location." That same year, Hussein agreed to a request from bin Laden to broadcast anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi state television. In 1997, al Qaeda sent an emissary with the nom de guerre Abdullah al Iraqi to Iraq for training on weapons of mass destruction. Colin Powell cited this evidence in his presentation at the UN on February 5, 2003. The Senate Intelligence Committee has concluded that Powell's presentation on Iraq and terrorism was "reasonable." In 1998, according to documents unearthed in Iraq's Intelligence headquarters in April 2003, al Qaeda sent a "trusted confidante" of bin Laden to Baghdad for 16 days of meetings beginning March 5. Iraqi intelligence paid for his stay in Room 414 of the Mansur al Melia hotel and expressed hope that the envoy would serve as the liaison between Iraqi intelligence and bin Laden. The DIA has assessed those documents as authentic. In 1999, a CIA Counterterrorism Center analysis reported on April 13 that four intelligence reports indicate Saddam Hussein has given bin Laden a standing offer of safe haven in Iraq. The CTC report is included in the Senate Intelligence Committee's review on prewar intelligence. In 2000, Saudi Arabia went on kingdom-wide alert after learning that Iraq had agreed to help al Qaeda attack U.S. and British interests on the peninsula. In 2001, satellite images show large numbers of al Qaeda terrorists displaced after the war in Afghanistan relocating to camps in northern Iraq financed, in part, by the Hussein regime. In 2002, a report from the National Security Agency in October reveals that Iraq agreed to provide safe haven, financing and weapons to al Qaeda members relocating in northern Iraq. In 2003, on February 14, the Philippine government ousted Hisham Hussein, the second secretary of the Iraqi embassy in Manila, for his involvement in al Qaeda-related terrorist activites. Andrea Domingo, head of Immigration for the Philippine government, told reporters that "studying the movements and activities" of Iraqi intelligence assets in the country, including radical Islamists, revealed an "established network" of terrorists headed by Hussein. Can CNN stand by its claim that "there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was connected in any way to al Qaeda?" Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard. He is author of The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein has Endangered America, published by Harper Collins weeklystandard.com

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	6/30/2005 8:59:12 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

"Note that the resolution puts the Iraq war in the context of September 11 without saying that Iraq was involved in those attacks; it recites what was indisputably true--that Iraq harbored members of al Qaeda." September 11 and Iraq: Short Memories Power Line The mainstream media continue their faux outrage over the link that President Bush drew between September 11 and the Iraq war in his speech Tuesday night; here is one of countless examples. azcentral.com This is, frankly, mystifying; as one of our readers pointed out yesterday, the connection between the Iraq war and September 11 was made explicit in the text of the Congressional resolution that authorized military action in Iraq. Here are some excerpts: Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq; Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens; Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations; Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations; Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations; Note that the resolution puts the Iraq war in the context of September 11 without saying that Iraq was involved in those attacks; it recites what was indisputably true--that Iraq harbored members of al Qaeda. One would think that administration critics like Joe Biden, John Kerry, Harry Reid and Chuck Schumer would remember what was in the resolution, since they voted for it. I can understand why it would be convenient for the Democrats to forget that the resolution that authorized the Iraq war specifically and repeatedly linked the rationale for that war to the September 11 attacks. It is not so clear why mainstream reporters and commentators are so willing to share the Democrats' amnesia. powerlineblog.com pbs.org geocities.com

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	7/1/2005 12:18:57 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

The coalition of the deaf and blind By: Patrick Ruffini · Section: War RedState.org Feigned shock and surprise seems to be the emotion du jour on the Left. What do you mean that invasion of Iraq may have been a policy option as early as 2002? We were never notified! Their latest antics call for pretending that September 11th and the Iraq War are two separate and totally unrelated events, until two nights ago, when President George W. Bush contrived to make them one. There's been quite a bit of discussion of late about what liberals did or didn't do in the aftermath of 9/11, and what they did or didn't know. In their narrative, we were solidly united, until George Bush started a completely unannounced and unexpected war. And so, the Coalition of the Deaf and Blind came into being, dedicated to flushing down the memory hole the new hawkish thinking about terrorism and national security in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In light of these histrionics, it might be helpful to examine the world as it actually was in September 2001, and what President Bush said, in his own words, about what lay ahead in the war on terror – in a time when 90% of Americans and 80% of Democrats supported his policies. The night of September 11, 2001 was not one for bold, sweeping policy pronouncements. Nonetheless, the President gave his first hint that this conflict would not be limited to those who perpetrated these acts, but to the states that supported them: The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. In the days that followed, there would be much discussion of the name used to define this struggle: the war on terror. There was nothing inevitable or automatic about how our war aims were defined. In fact, it would have been easier had the President limited his objectives to a Clintonesque "We will find the perpetrators and bring them to justice," followed by a particularly intense round of sand-pounding in Afghanistan, and a ticker-tape parade down Broadway six weeks later, bringing this whole chapter in our history to a swift conclusion. Given America's mastery of lightning fast quasi-wars – Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf (still then the archetype), Bosnia, Kosovo – this would have been the obvious and conventional route. But, in a moment of decision, the President concluded that this time, something different and greater was called for. And he did something that you wouldn't have expected, committing us to a long struggle to eradicate terrorism broadly defined, not just mitigate it. At the time, Democrats overwhelmingly supported this. Another hint that this would be a big war, more like the Cold War than the Persian Gulf War, came in President Bush's radio address the Saturday following the attacks: Victory against terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in a series of decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them. We are planning a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism. And we are determined to see this conflict through. Americans of every faith and background are committed to this goal. The President's September 20, 2001 address to a joint session of Congress was the foundational statement of this war, and it was applauded by virtually all who today form the Coalition of the Deaf and Blind. In it, the President stated that nation-states would not be off-limits in this war: The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. And, in a crucial passage, punctuated by bipartisan applause, the President explicitly declares that this war will extend beyond al Qaeda: Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. (Applause.) In another passage surely missed by the Coalition of the Deaf and Blind, the President prepared the country for a long and difficult war, and put the country on notice about what we should expect: This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (Applause.) From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Though necessarily broad, the September 20th speech was a remarkably prescient foreshadowing of everything that has happened in the last four years. Over the course of the eight months that followed, these very thoughts were amplified and refined in the doctrine of preemption announced at West Point on June 1, 2002. When that speech was delivered, the President's approval rating stood at 75%, and even in last year's campaign, a majority of Americans supported preemption. And yet, the Coalition of the deaf and blind insists that all of this is somehow news to them. But, but… Saddam Hussein didn't attack us on September 11th! There was no Iraq-al Qaeda connection! Leave aside just how dubious that latter claim is – (cough)Zarqawi(cough) – and calmly re-read the President's speeches from that September. The President didn't say al Qaeda – he said all terrorism. What about this do you not understand? From the fedayeen in Nasiriyah, to the "foreign fighters" from Egypt and Saudi Arabia found dead in the battle for Baghdad, to today's al Qaeda-driven insurgency, terrorism has been the sole means of waging war against American troops. It was Saddam's – and Zarqawi's – only war plan. Call us crazy, but is it that unreasonable to assume that: A terrorist after the war = a terrorist before the war? The debate over whether Ba'athist Iraq was a terror state as defined multiple times by the President in September 2001 is pretty much over. And yet liberals remain under the impression that Saddam was the Iraqi Robert E. Lee, an honorable and worthy opponent who obeyed the rules of warfare, and had nothing to do with terrorism. Only a member of a coalition of the deaf and blind could actually believe that. redstate.org downingstreetmemo.com whitehouse.gov whitehouse.gov whitehouse.gov whitehouse.gov

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	7/1/2005 12:55:54 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Down the Memory Hole Posted by: Dale Franks The QandO Blog Thursday, June 30, 2005 Ronald Brownstein, writing in the Los Angeles Times, presents his "analysis" of the President's speech on Iraq earlier this week. The article's title gives you a pretty good clue about Mr. Brownstein's take—which is either dishonest or ignorant: << "As War Shifts, So Does the Message" >>. As Mr. Brownstein puts it: <<< In the lead-up to the war, Bush presented the invasion of Iraq primarily as a means of preventing the Iraqi dictator from providing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons to terrorists. After coalition forces failed to find evidence of such weapons, and several investigations did not uncover meaningful links between Hussein and Al Qaeda, the president increasingly stressed the possibility that creating a democracy in Iraq could encourage democratic reform across the Middle East. >>> Really? Is that the way it actually happened? Because I remember it a bit differently. Yes, it was many, many years ago now, and perhaps I am simply unable to clearly recall the arguments made in that ancient time, but it seems to me that there was a multi-layered set of arguments about why we were going to attack Iraq. But why should we depend on my faulty memory? Hugh Hewitt points to an article by Nicholas Lehman, now the Dean of the Columbia School of Journalism, but in his youth, all those years ago, he was the Washington D.C. correspondent for The New Yorker. And in that august publication, in the 17 Feb 2003 issue, a full month prior to the invasion of Iraq, Mr. Lehman wrote the following: In his State of the Union address, President Bush offered at least four justifications, none of them overlapping: the cruelty of Saddam against his own people; his flouting of treaties and United Nations Security Council resolutions; the military threat that he poses to his neighbors; and his ties to terrorists in general and to Al Qaeda in particular. In addition, Bush hinted at the possibility that Saddam might attack the United States or enable someone else to do so. There are so many reasons for going to war floating around—at least some of which, taken alone, either are nothing new or do not seem to point to Iraq specifically as the obvious place to wage it—that those inclined to suspect the motives of the Administration have plenty of material with which to argue that it is being disingenuous. So, along with all the stated reasons, there is a brisk secondary traffic in 'real' reasons, which are similarly numerous and do not overlap: the country is going to war because of a desire to control Iraqi oil, or to help Israel, or to avenge Saddam's 1993 assassination attempt on President George H. W. Bush. Yet another argument for war, which has emerged during the last few months, is that removing Saddam could help bring about a wholesale change for the better in the political, cultural, and economic climate of the Arab Middle East. To give one of many possible examples, Fouad Ajami, an expert on the Arab world who is highly respected inside the Bush Administration, proposes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that the United States might lead 'a reformist project that seeks to modernize and transform the Arab landscape. Iraq would be the starting point, and beyond Iraq lies an Arab political and economic tradition and a culture whose agonies have been on cruel display.' The Administration's main public proponent of this view is Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who often speaks about the possibility that war in Iraq could help bring democracy to the Arab Middle East. President Bush appeared to be making the same point in the State of the Union address when he remarked that 'all people have a right to choose their own government, and determine their own destiny—and the United States supports their aspirations to live in freedom.' The title of Mr. Lehman's article is quite interesting: << "AFTER IRAQ: The plan to remake the Middle East" >> Indeed, the entire point of the article was to explain, in detail, the administration's strategy for a more Democratic Mideast after the toppling of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. So, it's clear there was some sort of plan for creating a representative Iraq, and extending that democratic revolution across the Mideast. Moreover, it was an argument that had emerged months prior to the actual invasion. Somehow, that apparently slipped by Mr. Brownstein. Now, Mr. Lehman is hardly a right-wing fanatic, and The New Yorker has never been a bastion of conservatism, either. And yet, there it is, in black and white. What, then can we make of Mr. Brownstein's argument, and, by extension, the arguments of legions of Democrats who've similarly made the "shifting arguments" accusation against the Administration? Because it is clear that the literate left, at least, was perfectly aware of these arguments at least a month prior to the actual invasion. Not to put too fine a point on it, accusations that the Bush Administration is "shifting arguments" about Iraq are either dishonest or ignorant. There was, as Mr. Lehman puts it, an "elaborately justified", multi-layered approach to the reasoning behind attacking Iraq. Those like Mr. Brownstein who claim differently now are simply either fools or knaves. And another thing: For those of you who, like Mr. Brownstein, are convinced that there was no link between al-Qaeda and the regime of Saddam Hussein because OBL and Hussein Hated each other, SoCalPundit presents a compilation of Al Qaeda/Saddam linkages. qando.net latimes.com hughhewitt.com newyorker.com socalpundit.com

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	7/30/2005 1:19:51 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Saddam’s Shia Slaughter: The 1991 Uprising Filed under: General— site admin Austin Bay Blog The AP reports (via the Houston Chronicle) that prosecutors are questioning Saddam about the Shia genocide his Republican Guard committed in the chaotic weeks following “the suspension” of Operation Desert Storm. Remember, Desert Storm was halted — Saddam agreed to US Security Council Resolution 687 (and subsequently 688). The resolutions had a list of requirements Saddan had to meet. Here are a few relevant to 2001 and 2005: Destroying weapons of mass destruction, halting all reaserch and acquisition programs related to WMD, renouncing terrorism (he threatened to launch terror attacks in 1990 and 1991), compensating victims of his depredations, and respecting the human rights of Iraqi citizens. The attacks on Shias and Kurds began before 688 was passed. UNSCR 687 and 688 are posted at the end of this discussion, with 688 first. (It’s shorter.) Here’s the first graf: <<< Saddam Hussein was called to a hearing where he was questioned about repression of the Shiite uprising in 1991, which erupted after U.S.-led forces drove the Iraqi army out of Kuwait, the chief investigative judge said today. >>> At a minimum 50,000 Iraqi Shia Arabs were murdered by the regime’s “defeated” thugs. Shias have told me the number is far higher — perhaps 150,000 men, women, and children killed the marshes and villages of southern Iraq. US and Iraqi investigators are still finding mass grave sites. When the US and allied forces entered Iraq in March 2003, a lot of Shias were suspicious. “Last time,” Shias said, “you left us to die.” They meant Late March and April 2001. Summer 2004 — I had this conversation with a Shia translator. It was late in the evening – the early hours of the morning, actually. I’d put in a long, twenty hour day. I was walking to a latrine and saw the man standing there, smoking a cigarette and thinking. He’d had a long day, too. “Col Bay, I have a question for you. What do you do when you write a novel?” He’d seen a copy of my latest novel, The Wrong Side of Brightness. I told him that the beginning of that book was a dilemma, and an ironic one, considering that I was back in uniform and serving in Iraq. “I know why we didn’t finish Desert Storm (in ‘91), but when the Republican Guard began slaughtering Shia farmers and killing the Kurds, and we sat–what’s the word? Moral torsion? A friend of mine was commanding a mech infantry battalion just south of one of those villages and he said they knew what was happening. They followed some of it on their field radios. Saw some smoke. He said it was the toughest thing he’d ever done as a soldier, to sit there as those thugs came back into those villages and committed murder.” The translator’s eyes squeezed as he took a long draw on the cigarette. “Yes, that happened,” he said. “I am Shia.” “I know.” “I’d like to see the book.” “There’s a copy in my office. That’s just the first chapter.” “I’ll look at it,” he said. I went on into the latrine. Several Civil Affairs officers I talked with acknowledged some Shia were reluctant to get involved politically (after the fall of Saddam) because they didn’t want to be “exposed to reprisal” if the US “cuts and runs” again. For me, it was a lived irony– soldiering in the after-effects of a strategic mistake that was the troubled moral core of a spy novel. Indeed. I want to hear what Saddam has to say– the whole, unexpurgated string of excuses and lies he’s spilling. Here’s the “imaginary” 1991 attack by the Republican Guard from the first chapter of The Wrong Side of Brightness: <<< But the next morning –God, forgive us. The intel officer showed me the report just before he dropped it on the battalion commander. That damned morning. Minutes after the report arrived, we identified Iraqi armored personnel carriers on the far side of the river, at the edge of the village. The intel update had said they might be coming but there was no if, now, no could be. We watched through long-range lenses as the army we had just defeated (elements of Republican Guards Armored Division Hammurabi and Motorized Infantry Division Nebuchadnezzar) quickly swept into the farm village. Some of the farmers, the women and kids scattered, a few darting west along the river bank into the marsh. The Republican Guard start to burn the thatch and corrugate houses, firing their automatic rifles into the air, putting a burst into a hut, pushing farm kids into a truck. Now one of the personnel carriers moved to the edge of the village and fired a long stream of heavy machine gun rounds into the marsh, the green tracers smashing the river bank, rounds slamming into mud, rounds kicking up white geysers in the brown river. We wanted to shoot back, every one of us. Our battalion commander, you could see it steel his round face. I ran up to him. No, dammit, get back in your tank, Ford. Dammit, Ford, you can’t argue this one. Christ. It would have been easy, so easy to open up at once and stop them cold. We could have done it at stand-off range with our direct fire weapons or crossed that river and handled it face to face. The criminal bastards would have run and this time we’d have shot them in the back as they ran. We were ready, willing, Lord forgive us we were so able and willing. But the war was over, Washington said, Washington had said it was. In the face of murder and rape they wouldn’t let us shoot back since it was done– Private First-Class R.B. Guyton, the loader on my battalion operations officer’s tank, lay prone on the top of the turret. He leaned forward, elbow braced, staring into his camera sight, his brown fingers coolly adjusting the big black seventy-millimeter zoom lens he’d won in a poker game. He pointed that pro photographer’s camera rig across the river at the village. “Major Ford,” Sergeant Benski muttered over the tank intercom. “The Hell we doing here?” Benski was in the turret in his gunner’s seat, and, from the lay of our tank’s maingun, Ben must’ve been watching the murder in his high-resolution ballistic sight. I didn’t reply. Through my binoculars, sitting on my butt on top of the commander’s hatch, I saw an Iraqi Republican Guard officer and this guy, a slender man wearing sunglasses and what looked like a gray jumpsuit, raise their automatic pistols. I saw them shoot a black-haired woman dressed in nurse’s whites –yeah, nurse’s whites and a startling face– then fire at two old men in the mud street of that village. The old men fell over the woman’s body. The guy in the jumpsuit walked up to the bodies, a jivey, too easy walk, not fast, and he fired again, execution shots where the bodies lurch with the bullets’ impact. I bit into my tongue. I bit so hard the medics had to swab the damn thing with peroxide. >>> I wrote the book in 1999. Lived its legacy in 2004. The two relevant UN Security Council Resolutions: UN Security Council Resolution 688: <<< RESOLUTION 688 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991 The Security Council, Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region, Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved, Taking note of the letters sent by the representatives of Turkey and France to the United Nations dated 2 April 1991 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22435 and S/22442), Taking note also of the letters sent by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22436 and S/22447), Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area, Bearing in mind the Secretary-General’s report of 20 March 1991 (S/22366), 1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region; 2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected; 3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities; 5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population; 6. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts; 7. Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends; 8. Decides to remain seized of the matter. >>> Here’s a link to the fas.org website where you can find the resolution and more information. FAS’ site has the same basic documents as the UN’s site but it’s better organized. fas.org UN Security Council Resolution 687: <<< RESOLUTION 687 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991 The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government, Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991), Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991), Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932, Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary, Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons, Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons, Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972, Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention, Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention, Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto, Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq, Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East, Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons, Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region, Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region, Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait, Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned, Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism, Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq, Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq, Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council, Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire; A 2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964; 3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month; 4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; B 5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters” of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace; 6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991); C 7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972; 8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; (b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities; 9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following: (a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below; (b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval: (i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself; (ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above; (iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below; 10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution; 11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968; 12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings; 13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency’s verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution; 14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons; D 15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact; E 16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait; 17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt; 18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund; 19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq’s contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq’s payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq’s liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above; F 20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated “no-objection” procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee; 21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein; 22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect; 23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq; 24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of: (a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment; (b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above; (c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above; (d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above; 25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements; 26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically; 27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance; 28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq’s compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region; 29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions; G 30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for; 31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990; H 32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism; I 33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990); 34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area. >>> austinbay.net chron.com

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	12/14/2005 6:51:36 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Uh huh, It's always been about "stockpiles" of WMD's & absolutely nothing else........ From Bush's speech today.... <<< September the 11th also changed the way I viewed threats like Saddam Hussein. We saw the destruction terrorists could cause with airplanes loaded with jet fuel -- and we imagined the destruction they could cause with even more powerful weapons. At the time, the leaders of both political parties recognized this new reality: We cannot allow the world's most dangerous men to get their hands on the world's most dangerous weapons. In an age of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. (Applause.) We removed Saddam Hussein from power because he was a threat to our security. He had pursued and used weapons of mass destruction. He sponsored terrorists. He ordered his military to shoot at American and British pilots patrolling the no-fly zones. He invaded his neighbors. He fought a war against the United States and a broad coalition. He had declared that the United States of America was his enemy. Over the course of a decade, Saddam Hussein refused to comply with more than a dozen United Nations resolutions -- including demands that he respect the rights of the Iraqi people, disclose his weapons, and abide by the terms of a 1991 cease-fire. He deceived international inspectors, and he denied them the unconditional access they needed to do their jobs. When a unanimous Security Council gave him one final chance to disclose and disarm, or face serious consequences, he refused to comply with that final opportunity. At any point along the way, Saddam Hussein could have avoided war by complying with the just demands of the international community. The United States did not choose war -- the choice was Saddam Hussein's. When we made the decision to go into Iraq, many intelligence agencies around the world judged that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. This judgment was shared by the intelligence agencies of governments who did not support my decision to remove Saddam. And it is true that much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong. As President, I'm responsible for the decision to go into Iraq -- and I'm also responsible for fixing what went wrong by reforming our intelligence capabilities. And we're doing just that. At the same time, we must remember that an investigation after the war by chief weapons inspector Charles Duelfer found that Saddam was using the U.N. oil-for-food program to influence countries and companies in an effort to undermine sanctions, with the intent of restarting his weapons programs once the sanctions collapsed and the world looked the other way. Given Saddam's history and the lessons of September the 11th, my decision to remove Saddam Hussein was the right decision. Saddam was a threat -- and the American people and the world is better off because he is no longer in power. (Applause.) We are in Iraq today because our goal has always been more than the removal of a brutal dictator; it is to leave a free and democratic Iraq in its place. As I stated in a speech in the lead-up to the war, a liberated Iraq could show the power of freedom to transform the Middle East by bringing hope and progress to the lives of millions. So we're helping the Iraqi -- Iraqi people build a lasting democracy that is peaceful and prosperous and an example for the broader Middle East. The terrorists understand this, and that is why they have now made Iraq the central front in the war on terror. >>>

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	8/18/2006 5:19:16 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 35834

Whenever one of your leftist peers brings up the tired old lie that there were no WMD's in Iraq, or that removing Saddam was unjustified because there were no "stockpiles" of WMD's in Iraq, have them go here & follow the links - ALL of them. NOTE: I have shamelessly plagiarized blog entries & articles from all over to compile this massive collection of evidence that thoroughly refutes every single lie the unhinged left has concocted regarding WMD's. If there's one thing you can count on these days is that hard core leftists can be stereotyped. They all have a rigorous aversion to all facts that utterly destroy the lies they have meticulously & unscrupulously manufactured to bring down the Bush Admin with. I'm just doing my part to help disabuse them of their many, many alternate realities. When will they learn? Saddam had WMD's & WMD Programs. They were but two of several legitimate reasons for his removal. The facts overwhelmingly speak for themselves. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Message 21188541 Message 21187887 Iraq Survey Group Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD cia.gov Report on the U.S. INTELLIGENCE Community's Prewar INTELLIGENCE Assessments on Iraq intelligence.senate.gov Conclusions (Excerpted From Full Report) intelligence.senate.gov Robb Silberman report Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction wmd.gov wmd.gov Butler Report butlerreview.org.uk butlerreview.org.uk Illegal arms pipeline to Iraq taraskuzio.net About those WMD's Message 22658180 Head of Iraq Survey Group - Charles Duelfer's Report: Saddam Planned to Restart WMD Programs Message 20611962 Last fall the Iraqi Survey Group uncovered, quote, "significant information, including research and development of biological weapons, applicable organisms, the involvement of the Iraqi intelligence service in possible biological weapons activities and deliberate concealment activities." Message 20961402 Reports That Nail Saddam Message 20622263 Message 20623841 Message 20303997 Message 20304687 Message 20309003 Message 21316235 Message 20316217 Message 19551934 More on the ISG Report Message 20615946 Message 20616191 Message 20616595 Message 20620010 Message 21273356 The Saddam Tapes Message 22172884 Message 22332997 Message 22306123 Message 22307221 Message 22340774 Message 22341584 The Saddam Tapes - 50 articles here siliconinvestor.com The Saddam Tapes - 51 articles here siliconinvestor.com Saddam Crazy Like A Fox Message 20619450 Message 21270384 Message 21270424 Message 21385249 Message 21393292 Iraq Hid Nuclear Program Intending On Rebuilding It Message 20565683 The Yellowcake Con The Wilson-Plame "scandal" was political pulp fiction Message 20315956 dev.siliconinvestor.com Message 20303710 Message 20304212 Message 20303710 Message 20323044 Message 20323089 Message 20325136 Message 20324865 Uday's Oil-for-News Program Message 21352670 UN Weapons Inspectors bribed Message 21055415 Message 21055429 Message 21128099 Documents Link Saddam To AQ, WMD, Other Terrorists dev.siliconinvestor.com dev.siliconinvestor.com dev.siliconinvestor.com Saddam did have WMD plans says inspector dev.siliconinvestor.com Iraq survey chief Kay stated, "I must say I actually think Iraq - what we learned during the inspections - made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the war"..... dev.siliconinvestor.com Kay says Iraq war was ‘prudent’ dev.siliconinvestor.com Saddam's WMD hidden in Syria, says Iraq survey chief dev.siliconinvestor.com "It Was Never About a Smoking Gun," - by David Kay dev.siliconinvestor.com Key Excerpts from David Kay's Testimony to the SENATE Armed Services Committee dev.siliconinvestor.com How long do you let... material breach, deception and denial go on before you risk with the kind of surprise that I could never fully and 100 percent predict? - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD INTELLIGENCE dev.siliconinvestor.com Investigative Reports - Saddam's WMD Have Been Found dev.siliconinvestor.com dev.siliconinvestor.com dev.siliconinvestor.com dev.siliconinvestor.com dev.siliconinvestor.com Message 21135609 Message 21136983 Message 21139294 Message 21141409 Message 21873388 Message 21892905 Message 21895696 Message 22104710 Message 22143342 Message 22148119 Message 22563181 Message 22566318 Message 22668468 Investigative Reports - Saddam's WMD Have Been Found - 18 articles here siliconinvestor.com biological weapons - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD INTELLIGENCE dev.siliconinvestor.com chemical weapons - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD INTELLIGENCE dev.siliconinvestor.com Mobile WMD Labs - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD INTELLIGENCE dev.siliconinvestor.com Mobile Labs Could Not Have Produced Hydrogen As Described, Prologue Message 22593753 5 more articles here siliconinvestor.com UAV's - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD INTELLIGENCE dev.siliconinvestor.com the nuclear issue - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD INTELLIGENCE dev.siliconinvestor.com Uh huh, It's always been about "stockpiles" of WMD's & absolutely nothing else........ Message 20911765 Message 21150613 Message 21063953 Message 21273612 Message 20965850 Message 21463085 Message 21465880 Message 21466350 Message 21466458 Message 21556716 Message 21973628 Inspections + Verification Message 20620056 Message 20809850 Yes, this war is legal Message 20809850 Clinton believed Iraq had WMD Fri 9 Jan 2004 dev.siliconinvestor.com dev.siliconinvestor.com Leading Dem's assert Saddam had WMD's Message 20629169 Message 21465569 Message 19511188 What are the odds that many of these players had a vested interest in pushing the false assertion that there were no WMD's in Iraq, ET AL? Uday's Oil-for-News Program Message 21352670 In 1998, Oil-for-Food became, increasingly, "Oil-for-Arms." Message 21041075 Message 21266408 dev.siliconinvestor.com Saddam's Arsenal - Arms From France, Russia, Germany, Belgium and China Message 18729921 French connection armed Saddam Message 20514571 washtimes.com powerlineblog.com Message 18779773 Message 18836568 e-thepeople.org Message 21324271 Message 21173231 Message 21246595 Message 21274030 Message 20826073 Iraq Survey Group - Bribes Message 20611925 Message 20615972 Message 20616347 Message 20619659 Message 20619904 Message 20623916 Message 21130631 UN Weapons Inspectors bribed Message 21055415 Message 21055429 Message 21128099 Russia, Unmasked Message 22291010 Message 22294329 Message 22294331 Message 22294492 Message 22297731 Message 22297742 Message 22297914 telegraph.co.uk. iraqcrisisbulletin.com. truthnews.com Message 21345608 Message 21441546 Message 20754680 The UN, France, Russia, Germany, China & the MSM bribed by Saddam Message 19604280 Message 22523585 Message 22573998 Message 22587564 Message 22615106 Message 22657929 Message 21833592 Message 21833615 Message 21833710 Message 21880872 Message 21894624 Message 21898250 Message 21899132 Message 21953947 Message 22039076 Message 22051270 Message 22183842 Message 22257320 Message 21555839 Message 21556647 Message 21556649 Message 21575241 Message 21578750 Message 21582424 Message 21584908 Message 21584941 Message 21589204 Message 21589350 Message 21604693 Message 21611894 Message 21615227 Message 21643498 Message 21666647 Message 21678636 Message 21681808 Message 21685565 Message 21689604 Message 21689731 Message 21700235 Message 21732607 Message 21734179 Message 21784011 Message 21788718 Message 21791956 Message 21816334 Message 21818086 Message 21829746 Message 21293364 Message 21299979 Message 21300019 Message 21319688 Message 21319845 Message 21324165 Message 21328879 Message 21328961 Message 21338257 Message 21345609 Message 21346697 Message 21387442 Message 21416299 Message 21417821 Message 21420527 Message 21435592 Message 21445972 Message 21481616 Message 21493356 Message 21510736 Message 21510758 Message 21555839 Message 21161756 Message 21162019 Message 21162057 Message 21162572 Message 21162694 Message 21170174 Message 21176392 Message 21180200 Message 21183452 Message 21183899 Message 21184942 Message 21189937 Message 21190744 Message 21197735 Message 21231417 Message 21231436 Message 21231460 Message 21234936 Message 21243075 Message 21243263 Message 21247021 Message 21250559 Message 21250960 Message 21257650 Message 21260919 Message 21270518 Message 21293364 Message 20932928 Message 20962130 Message 20999044 Message 21011611 Message 21015094 Message 21023006 Message 21015618 Message 21015623 Message 21041048 Message 21043667 Message 21048379 Message 21048721 Message 21049066 Message 21062527 Message 21145159 Message 21148073 Message 20772022 Message 20772937 Message 20772959 Message 20773131 Message 20774615 Message 20774790 Message 20775519 Message 20797266 Message 20803361 Message 20805641 Message 20818853 Message 20829564 Message 20841053 Message 20853921 Message 20867693 16 more bribe related articles here siliconinvestor.com George Galloway and Saddam Message 21822347 Message 21822364 Message 21823894 Message 21824108 Message 21827455 Message 22099925 Message 21360061 Message 22100040 Message 21833615 Message 21833710 Message 21319683 Message 21324215 Message 21319845 Message 21328961 Message 21333865 Message 21337139 Message 21337246 Message 21338167 Message 21338257 Message 21346643 Message 21351962 Message 21375545 Message 21400606 Message 21576002 Message 22490084

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	2/9/2007 1:26:43 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 35834

What will be lost in news accounts of the IG report and Levin's fulminations is that Feith's group was right. We know now that there were many connections between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda, and that Islamic groups of various stripes, including those labeled "secular" by the CIA, are entirely capable of collaborating against their common enemies. The Bureaucrats' War Continues Power Line During the halcyon early years of the Bush administration, it still seemed possible that the President and his appointees could prevail over the inertia and, often, outright hostility of the almost-entirely-Democratic federal bureaucracy. One instance of the administration's effort to get beyond the bureaucracy's stale thinking was the Defense Department's Office of Special Plans, which was overseen by Douglas Feith, who was then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Feith's group became known for challenging the CIA's dogmatic belief that Iraq's "secular" dictatorship couldn't possibly collaborate with radical Islamic groups like al Qaeda. The Office of Special Plans argued that the CIA consistently played down its own raw evidence of relationships between Iraq and al Qaeda because such evidence didn't fit the agency's theoretical framework. That act of lese majesty must naturally be punished. So tomorrow, the Pentagon's own Inspector General will present a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee on whether--I'm not kidding--it was illegal for the Defense Department to independently analyze the data gathered by the intelligence agencies. You can breathe a sigh of relief, though; the Inspector General concluded that disagreeing with the CIA is not a crime: <<< Some of the Pentagon's prewar intelligence work, including a contention that the CIA underplayed the likelihood of al-Qaida connections to Saddam Hussein, was inappropriate but not illegal, a Defense Department investigation has concluded. In a report to be presented to Congress on Friday, the department's inspector general said former Pentagon policy chief Douglas J. Feith had not engaged in illegal activities through the creation of special offices to review intelligence. The Senate Armed Services Committee has scheduled a hearing Friday to receive the findings by Thomas F. Gimble, the Pentagon's acting inspector general. The committee's chairman, Carl Levin, D-Mich., has been a leading critic of Feith's role in prewar intelligence activities and has accused him of deceiving Congress. In a telephone interview Thursday, Levin said the IG report is "very damning" and shows a Pentagon policy shop trying to shape intelligence to prove a link between al-Qaida and Saddam. Asked to comment on the IG's findings, Feith said in a telephone interview that he had not seen the report but was pleased to hear that it concluded his office's activities were neither illegal nor unauthorized. He took strong issue, however, with the IG's finding that some activities had been "inappropriate." "The policy office has been smeared for years by allegations that its pre-Iraq-war work was somehow 'unlawful' or 'unauthorized' and that some information it gave to congressional committees was deceptive or misleading," Feith said. Feith called "bizarre" the inspector general's conclusion that some intelligence activities by the Office of Special Plans, which was created while Feith served as the undersecretary of defense for policy --the top policy position under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld--were inappropriate but not unauthorized. >>> It will be interesting to see the full report. Offhand, I can't imagine how it could be "inappropriate" for the Department of Defense to disagree with the CIA about the significance of intelligence received by that agency. This is a lesson in the perils of serving in a Republican administration. Now that a Democrat majority in Congress can join forces with the Democrats in the federal bureaucracies, Republicans who cross the bureaucrats can consider themselves lucky not to be indicted. What will be lost in news accounts of the IG report and Levin's fulminations is that Feith's group was right. We know now that there were many connections between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda, and that Islamic groups of various stripes, including those labeled "secular" by the CIA, are entirely capable of collaborating against their common enemies. Via Power Line News. plnewsforum.com To comment on this post, go here. plnewsforum.com powerlineblog.com breitbart.com

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	2/22/2007 4:19:18 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Democrats disingenuous in their anti-war rhetoric By Victor Davis Hanson Townhall.com Columnist Thursday, February 22, 2007 Why did a majority of Democratic Senators - such as Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, Chris Dodd, John Edwards, Harry Reid, Jay Rockefeller and Chuck Schumer - vote to authorize a war with Iraq on Oct. 11, 2002? And why is this war now supposedly George Bush's misfortune and not theirs? The original fear of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, of course, played a role in their votes - but only a role. In the 23 writs that authorized force to remove Saddam, senators at the time also cited Iraq's sanctuary and subsidies for terrorists. Then there were Saddam's attempts to assassinate a former United States president; his repression of, and use of weapons of mass destruction against, his own people; and his serial violations of both United Nations and Gulf War agreements. If paranoia over weapons of mass destruction later proved just that, these other more numerous reasons to remove Saddam remain unassailable. Nevada's Sen. Reid summed up best the feeling of Democrats that there were plenty of reasons to remove Saddam Hussein in a post-9/11 climate. He reminded his Senate colleagues that Saddam's refusal to honor past agreements "constitutes a breach of the armistice which renders it void and justifies resumption of the armed conflict." But it was not just fear of Saddam alone that prompted Democrats to authorize the use of force to remove him. There was the more general, liberal notion of using American arms to stop violent dictators. While the Democratic Party has a strong pacifist wing, its mainstream has always advocated a global promotion of American liberal values - sometimes through the use of preemptory force. Many Democrats in Congress, for example, had earlier authorized George Bush Sr. to fight the first Gulf War to stop Saddam's mad drive to absorb Kuwait. In 1999, House Democrats sought, but failed, to pass congressional authorization for President Clinton's ongoing air war against Slobodan Milosevic. Democratic leaders from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama have long lamented that the United States did not preempt in Africa to stop the Rwandan genocide. In contrast, George Bush, not Al Gore, ran for the presidency in 2000 promising to end Clinton's humanitarian interventions, whether in the Balkans, Haiti or Somalia. As then-candidate Bush put it, "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building." Throughout American history, it was usually the Democratic Party that proved the more interventionist. Democratic Presidents - whether Woodrow Wilson in 1917, Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1939-40, Harry Truman in 1950, John Kennedy in 1963 or Bill Clinton in 1999 - long battled Republican isolationists who insisted that it was never in America's interest to fight costly wars abroad unless directly attacked by a foreign nation. Again, why then did the majority of Democratic Senators vote for the present war in October 2002? Partisan advantage explains much of the present posturing against an opposition president. But mostly, the rising Democratic furor comes as a reflection of public anger at the costs of the war -- and the sense that we are not winning. Unlike the invasion of Panama (1989), the Gulf war (1991), the Balkans war (1999) or even the Afghanistan conflict (2001-2007), Iraq has taken over 3,000 American lives. Had the reconstruction of Iraq gone as relatively smoothly as the three-week removal of Saddam, most Democratic candidates would now be heralding their past muscular support for democratic change in Iraq. So instead of self-serving attacks on the present administration, Democratic senators and candidates should simply confess that while most of the earlier reasons to remove Saddam remain valid, the largely unforeseen costs of stabilizing Iraq in their view have proved too high, and now outweigh the dangers of leaving. But they should remember one final consideration. The next time a Democratic administration makes a case for using America's overwhelming military force to preempt a Milosevic or a mass murderer in Darfur - and history suggests that one will - the Democrats' own present disingenuous anti-war rhetoric may come back to haunt them, ensuring that such future humanitarian calls will probably fall on ears as deaf as they are partisan. Victor Davis Hanson is a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and author, most recently, of "A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War." townhall.com

To: Sully- who wrote (11847)	2/26/2007 5:45:21 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

An Inconvenient Truth: Bill Clinton Was Right By Jay Tea on War On Terror Wizbang For a lot of people, the "Y2K" bug turned out to be much ado about nothing. Despite the dire warnings of catastrophes and disasters and mayhem when the calendar moved from 1999 to 2000, not a heck of a lot happened. But I think I've discovered one lasting effect from that time. While the wholesale rewriting of computers' memory might have been avoided, it seems to have struck a lot of people's memory. Every single time the debate over whether or not the invasion of Iraq was appropriate, whole chunks of actual, real history seem to vanish, to be replaced with fantasies and false memories and outright lies. Inconvenient Truth #1: in 1998, it was declared that the official policy of the United States government -- as overwhelmingly passed by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton -- to seek "regime change" in Iraq. That's a fancy euphemism for "get rid of Saddam and his cronies." Inconvenient Truth #2: By 2003, Saddam had spent over a decade perfecting his "cheat and retreat" game with regards to UN weapons inspections. He would pick a fight with the inspectors, fight it tooth and nail right up to the limit, then "back down" a little, winning concessions and conditions from the allied nations. Inconvenient Truth #3: The sanctions against Iraq, which so many people now say were working and kept Saddam contained, were under bitter attack by many of those same people for years. We had reports of how many thousands of Iraqi children were dying each month from the brutal, cruel, oppressive, crushing sanctions, and we were told how we should end them and find "other ways" to bring Saddam to heel. (I can't help but contrast this with the calls for sanctions on South Africa during its apartheid days, which I opposed at the time, citing many of the same arguments. But I was wrong about that -- the sanctions against South Africa did work, and it is now a free nation. I blame my youth and naivete at the time. What's the excuse for those who now desperately try to erase their arguments on Iraqi sanctions?) Inconvenient Truth #4: The "international community's" resolve on Iraq was weakening day by day. Saddam's perversion of the humanitarian-inspired Oil For Food program was well documented, as he turned it into his personal cash cow. Some of the money he lavished on himself and his supporters; some went into well-placed bribes of people who had considerable influence over the program itself, as well as key members of the United Nations Security Council. Moneys intended for the Iraqi people found its way into the pockets of key individuals and organizations within the UN, Russia, Germany, France, the UK, and the United States. Inconvenient Truth #5: Despite its wholesale surrender at the end of the first Gulf War, Iraq continued to commit acts of war and aggression. It fired on US planes flying over the UN-sanctioned No-Fly Zones. It tried to assassinate former President Bush in revenge. It refused to account for Kuwaitis who were "disappeared" during the invasion and occupation. And it continued to aid, abet, and sponsor terrorism around the world -- most flagrantly by paying the families of suicide bombers who struck at Israel. Inconvenient Truth #6: It never fully complied with the provisions of the 1991 surrender regarding weapons of mass destruction. Under those terms, Iraq agreed to provide a full accounting of all its WMDs, WMD material, WMD research, and WMD equipment, then destroy them all in fully-verifiable ways. Instead, Iraq lied, cheated, evaded, concealed, blustered, and did everything it could to keep some weapons, equipment, and other materials so it could reconstruct its arsenal after the sanctions were lifted. I've repeated this metaphor many, many times, but I'm going to bring it up yet again because it holds so true: Iraq was like a convicted criminal on probation. One of the conditions of that probation was that it remain "clean" of WMDs, and regularly submit proof of its innocence. There was no presumption of innocence. Iraq had already been found guilty, and it was obligated to continue to prove its ongoing innocence for the duration of its probation. And Iraq did pretty much everything it could to get out of that obligation. No, we haven't found massive stockpiles of WMDs in Iraq. That is utterly irrelevant. We found quite a few WMDs that Iraq failed to properly account for (largely poison gas shells, in various states of senescence -- but still lethal), but that, again, is irrelevant. The onus was on Iraq to account for these weapons, and it did not do so. Period. End of discussion. ("But officer, that's old weed! I forgot it was there! I stashed it under the couch years ago!" "Sorry, pal, it's still your pot, in your house. You're going back in the clink.") The fact is simple: by 2001, Iraq had repeatedly, deliberately, willingly violated many of the terms of his 1991 surrender, and was on the verge of getting away with it as the sanctions were under severe attack. The whole situation was put on hold with the 9/11 attacks, as suddenly the United States (and the rest of the world) found itself with far more pressing concerns, but their efforts continued largely unchecked. The sanctions, the attempts at containment, were crumbling under Iraq's determined efforts to undermine them. The crisis point was rapidly approaching, when the pressure to remove them, to certify that Iraq had fully complied with the terms of its 1991 surrender and was ready to move towards rejoining the community of nations (when in reality it had done no such thing) would become overwhelming. The choice was simple: act now, or let Iraq's bribery, bluster, and outright bullying triumph. At the time, I thought that removing Saddam and his cronies was the right choice -- indeed, the only choice. For all of the above reasons, as well as a host more, that I've spelled out on numerous occasions. And, to this day, I still believe so. Maybe I shouldn't have taken that Y2K fix that let me remember just what things were like vis-a-vis Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Perhaps I should have simply subsumed my own recollections to the collective revisionism of the anti-war crowd, who so fervently wish to recast events to their own satisfaction. It'd make life a hell of a lot simpler. feeds.wizbangblog.com